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DOCKET SELECTION AND JUDICIAL RESPONSIVENESS: THE
USE OF AI IN THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Pablo Rueda Saiz*

INTRODUCTION
Legal institutions in Latin America have been criticized for their unresponsiveness
to the most pressing social and political issues in the region. The excessive formalism
and lack of autonomy of courts, their inefficiency, and lack of access for most of its
population are but some of the most frequent criticisms.1 After the regions democratic transitions, most people expected the consolidation of the rule of law and human
rights. Many of these countries embarked on constitutional reforms that adopted a
relatively standard package of large-scale reforms of their judiciaries, including the
adoption or expansion of judicial review.2 Most of these countries also adopted
mechanisms that provide injunctive relief for the protection of fundamental rights,
like the amparo.3 This form of injunction was originally adopted in Mexico during
the nineteenth century, and spread in the late twentieth century to Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, along with similar injunctions for the protection of fundamental
rights, like the recurso de protección in Chile, or the tutela in Colombia.4
Recently, the formalism of Latin American courts has begun to recede, as legal
systems promote greater access to justice to their population. 5 To be sure, there have
been significant setbacks in the protection of human rights, as illustrated by the
situation in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, among others.6
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, LLB, Universidad
de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, MA, PhD, University of California Berkeley.
1
Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the Underprivileged?, in (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA, 258 (Univ.
Notre Dame Press, 1999).
2
See generally RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF
JUDICIAL REFORM (Domingo Pilar & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001).
3
See generally id.
4
See generally JUDICIAL POLITICS IN MEXICO: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY 6 (Andrea Castagnola & Saul Lopez Noriega eds., 2016).
5
Alexandra Huneeus et al., Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism
in Contemporary Latin America, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA
12 (Rachel Sieder et al. eds., 2005).
6
Critics Under Attack, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2021), https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06
/22/critics-under-attack/harassment-and-detention-opponents-rights-defenders-and (last visited
Dec. 13, 2021).
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However, courts throughout the region have become increasingly important political
players and legal culture has been significantly transformed.7 One important leader
in promoting this change in the region is the Colombian Constitutional Court,8
which has played an important role in controlling that countrys historically hypertrophied presidential power and extending the protection of fundamental rights to
traditionally marginalized segments of society.9
However, extending the protection of fundamental rights in Colombia promoted
a substantial rise in litigation, and the analysis and selection of lower courts decisions for review became a daunting task for the Court. From 1998 to 2018 the number
of cases filed increased from 10,872 to 607,313; this is an increase of 5,587% in
twenty years.10
To cope with this increase in litigation, the Colombian Constitutional Court
recently adopted an artificial intelligence (AI) mechanism, called PretorIA, to gradually
replace the current system for selecting its docket in tutela, which relies on law
clerks reviewing all lower court decisions and writing case file summaries.11 Although there are discrepancies regarding the precise AI technology that PretorIA
currently uses,12 the use of any form of AI to help judges preselect the docket of a
court at the apex of a judicial system raises questions both with respect to the nature
of docket selection and the effects of using AI for this task. How is the selection of
the docket of a high court related to law, and is it related to human experience?
This Article addresses some of the limitations of AI as a tool to preselect a long
or shortlist of cases for a court at the apex of the judicial system to review. It focuses
on the Colombian Constitutional Court, as an example of a court at the apex of the
judicial system that has been historically responsive to claims for fundamental rights.
Docket selection is an example of a classification problem using supervised learning,
in which a machine groups data according to preestablished characteristics.
This Article draws from two different bodies of literature to analyze the consequences of using AI to preselect the docket of Colombias Constitutional Court. It
draws from political science models of the functions of courts and the structure of
7

See generally CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN
LATIN AMERICA (Javier Couso et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).
8
MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: LEADING CASES 1 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2017).
9
See id.
10
See Tutelas radicadas en la Corte Constitutional, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL DE COLOMBIA:
ESTADISTICAS DE LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/la
corte/estadisticas.php [https://perma.cc/3KT3-FZ2E] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
11
See Constitutional Court of Colombia, Agreement 02 of 2015, arts. 53(a), 54(c)(d),
55, which reform the courts internal rules of procedure.
12
Conoce nuestra Investigación sobre PretorIA, la tecnología que incorpora la Inteligencia Artificial a la Corte Constitucional, DEJUSTICIA (2021), https://www.dejusticia.org
/conoce-nuestra-investigacion-sobre-pretoria-la-tecnologia-que-incorpora-la-inteligencia-arti
ficial-a-la-corte-constitucional/ [https://perma.cc/PV32-WGCR] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
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the judiciary to show the importance of docket selection to provide high courts with
complete information about existing conflict in a society.13 Secondly, it draws from
critiques of AI made by philosophers of the mind14 and cognitive scientists to illustrate the importance of human experience in docket selection.15 These critiques focus
on the ways human experience and our interaction with the world shape our cognitive abilities and processes, to illustrate the differences between human intelligence
and AI.16 The Article uses that literature to show that AI can help in identifying and
preselecting cases based on well-defined legal categories. The use of AI, however,
can also bring more significant problems. On the one hand, AI classification can
sometimes include cases that do not deserve to be selected, producing which are
known as false positives. However, the use of AI may produce more difficult problems because a machine cannot help the Court identify emerging patterns of social
conflict, or naturalized patterns of social interaction that have recently been perceived as problematic. In other words, it also fails to preselect cases that are worth
selecting, which are known as false negatives. Moreover, during times of social and
political change, courts can become unresponsive or reactionary, and the costs associated with false negatives tend to be much greater.
This Article is divided into five parts. The first part briefly surveys the relevant
AI technologies and elaborates on the criticisms made by philosophers and cognitive
scientists. The second part introduces a model that describes the functions of courts,
highlighting that such functions vary depending on the position of a court within the
structure of the judiciary and showing the importance of information flows within
the judiciary for the operation of a well-functioning legal system. The third part describes the role played by the Colombian Constitutional Court and how its responsiveness promoted an increase in fundamental rights litigation. The fourth part describes
the current docket selection mechanism and how AI is starting to be used by the Court.
The fourth part analyzes the consequences of using AI in preselecting the docket.
Finally, the conclusion highlights some of the theoretical implications and makes
recommendations for more sensitive ways in which AI can be used to promote greater
efficiency and legal certainty.
I. AI AND THE WAY MACHINES LEARN
Lawyers, law firms, judges, and governmental agencies currently use AI for various purposes. Lawyers have been using AI to identify all the relevant precedents that
13

See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1986); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE-SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION
10211 (2002).
14
John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 41724 (1980).
15
See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND & ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999).
16
Benjamin Alarie et al., How Artificial Intelligence Will Affect the Practice of Law, 68
UNIV. TOR. L.J. (SUPP. 1) 10610 (2018).
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may improve the chances of success of their clients. 17 Firms also use it to predict the
outcomes of cases,18 evaluate the probabilities of success and advise their clients. 19
Moreover, lawyers have also used AI to predict the way in which specific judges are
going to vote on certain issues.20 Governmental institutions have also started to use
it to find relevant precedents and determine their probabilities of success in pursuing
certain courses of action against citizens and companies, for example, in matters
related to taxation.21 Furthermore, these institutions use AI not only to assist them
by providing, filtering, and analyzing information, but to replace officials in some of
their tasks. For example, prosecutors specialized in taxation matters in the province
of Buenos Aires use AI to draft certain decisions in these legal procedures.22 Finally,
companies like eBay and others have gone even further, using AI to settle the
disputes between providers and recipients of the goods and services exchanged in
their platform.23
Proponents of expanding the use of AI in law assure that AI can promote greater
legal certainty, because it mitigates human errors, biases, and corruption in the
application of legal standards.24 They also claim using AI makes the legal system
more efficient and less expensive, because AI can analyze large quantities of data
in only a fraction of the time and resources used by humans.25 On the other hand, AI
detractors claim that the conflicts that reach the legal system are usually not those
where there is a clear rule applicable to a well-known set of facts.26 These skeptics
argue that the opposite is true. Cases that reach the legal system are those in which
there are no clearly applicable rules, and where facts are disputed. Moreover, other
AI skeptics also highlight that at the current state of AI development machines are
incapable of analogical reasoning, which is the type of reasoning used in law.27
17

Id.
Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of
Behaviourism, 68 UNIV. TOR. L.J. (SUPP. 1) 6381 (2018).
19
Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 10102 (2014).
20
Id. at 103.
21
See DEJUSTICIA, supra note 12.
22
Id.
23
Jeremy Barnett & Philip Treleaven, Algorithmic Dispute ResolutionThe Automation
of Professional Dispute Resolution Using AI and Blockchain Technologies, 61 COMPUT. J.
399408 (2018).
24
Arthur Rizer & Caleb Watney, Artificial Intelligence Can Make Our Jail System More
Efficient, Equitable, and Just, 23 TEX. REV. LAW POLIT. 199202 (2018).
25
See generally Daniel L. Chen, Judicial Analytics and the Great Transformation of
American Law, 27 ARTIF. INTELL. L. 1542 (2019) (highlighting the data that AI can consider).
26
GIOVANNI SARTOR & L. KARL BRANTING, JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 105 (1998).
27
Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning (Chi. Pub. L. & Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 18, 2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=289789 [https://perma
.cc/4KM7-6VPP] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
18
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To gain a better understanding of the reach that AI can have in the legal system,
one should gain a clearer understanding of what AI is and what it is not. Therefore,
this section will briefly describe some of the technologies used in artificial intelligence that are relevant to establish its possibilities and limitations as a tool in the
legal system. After this, the section will address some of the early criticisms made
to AI by philosophers of the mind and cognitive scientists.
The basic building blocks of AI are algorithms. Algorithms are well-defined instructions followed by calculations or other problem-solving operations, which are
capable of systematic application and provide conclusions.28 In turn, AI is a difficult
term to define, but it commonly refers to a field of computer science that uses algorithms with a level of sophistication such as to resemble certain aspects of human
intelligence.29 Human intelligence, in turn, is considered the ability to reason, solve
problems, and to learn. Of course, this is a rather vague definition, which both reflects
and seeks to encompass different approaches to the term.30
However, any serious analysis of the applications of AI should be aware of the
vagueness of such definitions. In both common language and technical parlance,
terms such as intelligence tend to conflate multiple abilities and processes which are
very different in nature. Further adding to these definitional complexities, extrapolations of the concept of intelligence outside of its more traditional, i.e., human, domain
tend to obscure the more specific set of abilities and processes that it denotes. Early
philosophical analyses of AI noticed these problems and questioned whether intelligence in humans meant the same kind of abilities and processes that computers
could execute.31 In other words, they called into question whether computers could
in fact reason or learn in the same ways human beings can.32
Perhaps one of the earliest and most influential philosophical analyses of the
differences between human intelligence and AI was done by Hubert Dreyfus.33 Following his lead, decades later cognitive scientists Philip Johnson and George Lakoff
28

The Definitive Glossary of Higher Math Jargon, MATH VAULT, https://mathvault.ca
/math-glossary/ [https://perma.cc/D9ZR-MHYQ] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021); Comparison
of Algorithms and Heuristics, BIOINFORMATICS ORG., https://www.bioinformatics.org/wiki
/Comparison_of_algorithms_and_heuristics [https://perma.cc/3GDQ-KN83] (last visited
Dec. 13, 2021).
29
DAVID POOLE ET AL., COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A LOGICAL APPROACH 12
(1998).
30
See generally STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH (2020).
31
See generally id.
32
From a phenomenological perspective, see HUBERT L. DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS
CANT DO: THE LIMITS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1979) [hereinafter DREYFUS, WHAT
COMPUTERS CANT DO]; HUBERT DREYFUS, MIND OVER MACHINE (1988). From an analytical
perspective that stresses the significance of consciousness and intentionality, see Searle, supra
note 14.
33
DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS CANT DO, supra note 32.
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also questioned the possibility of disembodied cognition.34 Both analyses questioned a series of assumptions underlying the idea of AI. The first assumption is that
we can make a rigid distinction between mind and body, and that human intelligence
is an internal attribute of the mind, which is independent from its physical context.
Some have called this assumption the disembodied conception of the mind.35 The
second assumption is that the mind operates by systematically following internal rules
that can be modelled mathematically.36 These critics claimed that these assumptions
were unfounded. From different disciplines, they converged on their view that human
cognition is not an internal attribute, but an interdependent, or relational phenomenon,
deeply embedded within its physical (i.e., biological, social, political, and cultural)
context.37 Secondly, they claimed that human intelligence does not operate according to preestablished rules and processes that are systematically applied by the mind
to represent the world and resolve problems.38 Thus, human intelligence cannot be
described, much less replicated, using mathematical models.
Dreyfus initial critique was directed toward early models of AI that relied on
a single, initial input of large quantities of information.39 In the early models this initial
input allowed machines to understand the world and develop cognition without any
ulterior adaptation or adjustment based on the interaction of the computer with its
context.40 As we will see, later generations of AI, like machine learning, addressed
this issue and incorporated certain forms of contextual interaction for cognition and
problem-solving. However, even now AI maintains two of the features criticized by
Dreyfus, Lakoff, and Johnson: it still relies on the possibility of a disembodied cognizant entity, and a mathematical modelling of intelligence.41 Then, in what ways
can a computer be said to be intelligent?
One way of understanding this is by looking at machine learning (ML). Machine
learning is the ability of certain computers to infer operational rules, based on their
interaction with new information, without having been specifically programmed to
follow such rules.42 Rather, the programmer trains the computer with an initial
information set, and as the computer interacts with new information, it identifies
patterns that allow it to arrive at certain conclusions and create new operational rules
to execute its task better.43 A favorite example used by the literature to explain how
34

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 4.
HUBERT L. DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CANT DO: A CRITIQUE OF ARTIFICIAL
REASON 23537 (1992) [hereinafter DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CANT DO].
36
Id. at 14.
37
Id.; see also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 3.
38
DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CANT DO, supra note 35, at 256.
39
Id. at 26061.
40
Id. at 12.
41
Id. at 67.
42
Id. at 1.
43
Id.
35
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ML works to resolve classification problems is the identification of spam,44 although
as we will see, comparing spam to a courts docket selection might induce some confusion. Programmers of algorithms used by your email service commonly introduce
certain rules that help the system identify spam and exclude it from inboxes. One
such spam identification rule might order the computer to classify as spam those
emails containing a specific text in their subject. In doing so, the computer finds a
new pattern that shows a strong correlation between messages containing the
identified text in their subject, and those coming from senders in certain parts of the
world, or emails which include certain images in their content. Based on those correlations, an ML system may develop a new rule classifying as spam those emails
sent from the parts of the world that correlate to the subjects text, or those containing
related images.45
However, one should note that this technology does not create rules deductively,
based on a general, abstract concept of spam and then recognizing examples of it in
specific emails. Instead, ML uses an inductive and probabilistic approach.46 Thus,
contrary to human intelligence, which reasons both inductively and deductively, ML
only works inductively, approaching the concept of spam by identifying patterns
that allow tentative generalizations with regards to potentially undesirable emails.
The inductive nature of this process helps the system adapt to change, but it also
limits the ability to reason using more abstract concepts or categories, which is an
important feature of human cognition.47 This approach can lead to both overinclusion,
or false positives, and under inclusion, or false negatives, which can lead to biases
in the analysis and processing of information.48 As we have all experienced, sometimes important emails go to the spam folder and sometimes spam emails are not
identified and go directly to our inbox. For example, one might receive an email
from a colleague living in a country that the machine associates with spam. Then,
the machine might send it to the spam folder, and one may never read it. This would
44

Surden, supra note 19, at 106.
Id. at 9093.
46
Id. at 9395.
47
See generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15 (using the concept of metaphors and
metaphorical reasoning to refer to this capacity of abstraction.). This form of reasoning is
analogous to the notion of family resemblances used by Ludwig Wittgenstein to refer to a
mode of classification and comparison that is not based on the presence of specific attributes
to define abstract categories, but on more holistic, or integrated perceptual analyses. LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Joachim Schulte ed., P. M. S. Hacker
tran., 2009).
48
See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 78 (Sunstein considers that machines cannot engage
in analogical reasoning because they cannot determine the relative importance of criteria
used to determine the precedent that governs a case, either to liken or to distinguish them.
The problem, however, might be more related to their inability for metaphorical and family
resemblance reasoning that Lakoff, Johnson, and Wittgenstein referred to). See generally
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15; WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 47.
45
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be a problem of overinclusion, or a false positive, because the machine classifies the
colleagues email as spam. In that same vein, spam senders might use a sophisticated
VPN system to disguise the country of origin, switch the subjects of the emails, or
the images they use, and we might end up receiving spam in our inboxes. More
importantly, the design of the algorithm and the selection of the initial training set
from which the computer will develop its initial rules can also lead to systematic
bias, which leads to the necessity of transparency in the design of the algorithm and
the selection of the training set.49
However, one must bear in mind that when a machine erroneously classifies a
colleagues email as spam (a false positive), it excludes it so you wont have access
to it. In contrast, when the machine erroneously classifies a case file as worthy of
selection (also a false positive), the result is that the Court will have access to it. As
we can observe, the algorithm produces different results in these two cases of false
positives. However, this Article is not concerned with the problem of false positives
in docket selection. Instead, it focuses on the consequences of false negatives in
docket selection, especially during times of social and political change.
To enable AI systems to manage and use more abstract categories and minimize
random and systematic errors without a prohibitively expensive human intervention,
computer scientists developed deep learning. Deep learning is a technique that
uses multiple levels or layers of analysis to process more complex data sets.50 Each
layer analyzes the previous layers output, gradually transforming raw data, turning
it into an increasingly complex representation so that as the layers progress, they
execute more comprehensive tasks.51 Deep learning is commonly used in visual and
speech recognition of different sorts, including the recognition of texts. In the first
layers, the machine usually focuses on the level of pixels, and in successive layers
it focuses on recognizing the complete letter, word, or symbol, regardless of the irrelevant differences in the ways they are represented. The advantage of this technology is that it allows the machine to transform unstructured data into structured data
that can be used directly.52
Perhaps the area of AI that can be of greater help for processing case files and
preselecting the dockets of high courts is Natural Language Processing (NLP). NLP
is a subfield of computer science that focuses on the interactions between computers
and natural language. It focuses on the ability of computers to analyze large volumes
of natural language data.53 Some of the most important features of NLP are its abilities
to use probability to identify syntactic structure, and identify a specific terms semantic
field. The computers ability to identify parts of speech enable it to analyze more
49

See Surden, supra note 19.
See JOHN D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 12 (MIT Press, 2019).
51
See id. at 1315.
52
See Yann LeCun et al., Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 43644 (2015).
53
See DANIEL JURAFSKY & JAMES MARTIN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE PROCESSING (2nd
ed. 2008).
50
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complex grammatical structures, approach a documents content in a more refined
way and understand the relevance of specific terms in a document, as well as across
documents.54 In turn, the machines ability to identify semantic fields enables it to
identify patterns without having to rely on the presence of specific search terms in
the data being analyzed, which is useful when peopleor courtsuse different
terms interchangeably. For example, an ML algorithm can establish patterns that
enable it to learn and operationalize the relation between the terms right, freedom, and entitlement, and include these analogous terms within their tasks.55
The ability of a machine to process information in texts and find patterns does
not mean that it can understand or learn language the way humans do. It can only
process information, assign different values to it, and adjust its operation according
to its subsequent interactions with datasets. Initial formulations of a machines ability
to understand language were articulated by mathematician Alan Turing, who created a heuristic called The Imitation Game.56 He claimed that if such machines were
able to imitate the external behavior of someone who understands language, and a
third party was unable to know the difference between human and machine behavior, one could conclude that the machine was capable of understanding.57
However, this externalist approach was later refuted by philosopher John
Searle, who criticized the conflation of external appearance, or the outcome of
thought, and its internal process.58 Searle then designed his own heuristic to rebut
Turings, which he called The Chinese Room, to determine whether a machine could
understand Chinese language.59 In this heuristic, a human who does not understand
Chinese is placed inside a room and provided with a question in Chinese characters.
This person then carries out exactly the same computational operations that a
machine would in order to answer the question, also using Chinese characters. The
question that Searle asks is whether the execution of the same operations as a computer would enable the person inside the room to learn any Chinese.60 The answer
is obviously not, because the execution of the computational operations does not
require or permit understanding Chinese.61 The person inside the Chinese room
simply executes a (very long) series of mathematical operations to answer the question,
but once this person goes out of the room, their knowledge of the Chinese language
will be the same as before.62 In other words, executing the same mathematical
54

See id.
See HOBSON LANE ET AL., NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING IN ACTION: UNDERSTANDING, ANALYZING, AND GENERATING TEXT WITH PYTHON (2019).
56
A.M. Turing, Computing Machine and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 446 (1950).
57
See ANDREW HODGES ET AL., PARSING THE TURING TEST. PHILOSOPHICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE QUEST FOR THE THINKING COMPUTER (2009).
58
See Searle, supra note 14.
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
55
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operations as a computer able to answer a question in Chinese characters does not
help a person to learn Chinese.
II. THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF COURTS AND THEIR
ROLES WITHIN WEBERIAN HIERARCHIES
This section describes the basic functions of courts, their relation to the hierarchical structure of the judiciary, and the ways in which information flows about
existing social conflict affect the responsiveness of the legal system. As we will see
later in this Article, docket selection is important because it provides information
about existing social conflict to high-level courts. Using AI to preselect the docket
filters out emerging conflicts and legally accepted forms of social interaction that
later become problematic as our understanding of them changes.
Following legal anthropologists, forty years ago Martin Shapiro challenged the
traditional formalist model of courts. According to the formalist model, courts are
institutions that resolve conflicts according to pre-existing rules, through adversarial
procedures which result in zero-sum solutions in which one party is legally right,
and the other is legally wrong.63 Shapiro suggested instead that courts perform three
basic functions: they resolve conflicts by acting as mediators, splitting wins and losses
between the parties to disputes; they engage in social control that tends to centralize
power; and they make legal rules, both within the margins left by the other branches
of power or by redefining the law altogether.64 However, higher and lower courts
engage in mediation, social control, and lawmaking to a different extent. Higher
courts engage in lawmaking more frequently and openly than lower courts, whereas
the lower courts engage in more mediation and social control than lawmaking.65
These differences in the extent to which different courts perform these three
functions lead to a descriptive model of the way the judiciary operates. To carry out
these three functions, courts operate as functionally differentiated organs within the
larger judicial system, which can be conceptualized as a Weberian bureaucratic hierarchy. In this type of hierarchy, the organs at the bottomthe lower courtsgather
information about existing social conflict and noncompliance, filtering and channeling
it upward to the highest courts through the appeals process and review mechanisms.66
In turn, the highest courts send messages signaling the applicable law to lower courts.67
A. Information Redundancies and Legal Change
As in any Weberian hierarchy, some information is necessarily lost, or filtered,
in the communication between higher and lower courts. To minimize information
63
64
65
66
67

See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 1.
Id. at 63.
See id. at 3941.
See id. at 4951.
See id. at 5455.
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loss, the judicial system relies on redundancies. Multiple lower courts are providing
higher courts with information about similar social conflicts through the appeals
system, whereas higher courts are retransmitting their rules downward, over and over,
by reiterating precedent.68 In theory, because the information is provided by a variety
of lower courts, the possibility that higher courts receive skewed information about
existing social conflict is lower. In turn, the continuous reiteration of rules issued by
higher courts increases the probability that lower courts will follow their precedents.
According to this operational model of the judiciary, information redundancy
contributes to guarantee that high courts are well informed about existing conflict
in society and lower courts are well informed about the applicable law.69 Therefore,
a judiciary operating according to this model provides greater stability to the legal
system and adjustments are adopted piecemeal, producing only incremental changes
in the law in order to correct minor errors.
This model presupposes certain types of social conflict will be channeled bottomup through the court system. Channeling social conflicts up through the judicial
system usually would require that lower courts identify such social conflicts as justiciable claims; for example, when the conflicts they resolve can be understood as violations of fundamental rights. However, in a system that adheres to the principle of
vertical stare decisis, lower courts receive signals from higher courts indicating when
a certain type of social conflict is a justiciable claim. In lieu of such signals, lower
courts usually discard the claim as nonjusticiable.
Most social conflicts are never even taken to court, either people either to normalize injurious experiences as part of the status quo70 or because they lack the resources to change it.71 Individuals face numerous obstacles to perceive their experiences as injurious and frame them as claims that could eventually be channeled
through the legal system. Therefore, most injurious experiences are never channeled
through the legal system or negotiated under the shadow of law.72 As Felstiner, Abel,
and Sarat have convincingly argued, the legal system poses significant obstacles for
individuals to give a name to their injurious experiences, to attribute their occurrence to someone (blaming), and then to be able to claim some form of redress,
either directly or through the courts.73
Furthermore, perceptions of what constitutes an injurious experience, and what
should or should not be a justiciable claim change over time. These changes often
68
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occur in a piecemeal fashion in cases where lower courts sporadically nibble on
existing legal doctrines to gradually change the ideas about the justiciability of social
conflicts. For this reason, the judiciary adopts most legal changes incrementally. When
these changes occur gradually, the judiciary operates according to the Weberian
hierarchy model described above.
However, historical institutionalists have shown that long periods of relative
stability, characterized only by incremental social, political, and institutional change,
are usually followed by more drastic changes according to the model of punctuated
equilibrium.74 In these circumstances, the courts can adopt incremental changes
lagging behind the rapidly changing social norms or respond by promptly adopting
drastic legal changes.
One of the most drastic changes in recent times with regards to fundamental
rights corresponds to what has been known as the new constitutionalism. The new
constitutionalism refers to a rather inchoate phenomenon occurring in different parts
of the world from roughly the 1970s to the late 1990s, where countries throughout
the globe embarked on significant constitutional reforms or otherwise underwent
constitutional transformations led by the judiciary.75 To a large extent, the new
constitutionalism was an institutional response to political and economic transformations. Changes in political regimelike democratizationor in the mode of production
and economic exchangelike market liberalization or economic integrationor a
combination of both, were usually accompanied by constitutional reforms.76
A key aspect of the new constitutionalism was to create new constitutional
courts, increase their power for judicial review, or in any case, grant courts a greater
role in governance, especially through the protection of individual rights.77 These
changes were of significant magnitude and abruptness, and for that reason they have
been sometimes called rights revolutions. One such example is France, where the
Constitutional Council created a Bill of Rights, the constitutional bloc, by incorporating the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the European Convention,
and other documents to the otherwise rights-sparse Constitution of the Fifth Republic.78
Perhaps even more impressively, in the United Mizrahi Bank v. Cooperative Village
decisions, the Israeli Constitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of statutes
74
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for violating fundamental rights despite the fact Israel lacks a written constitution.79
However, although these are especially significant cases of rights revolutions, there
have been many others.80 Some have even successfully occurred in authoritarian
regimes like Egypt.81 However, not all have been successful. Some rights revolutions have rapidly failed like in Russia82 or were only able to maintain rights protection for a limited time until a backlash occurred, like in Hungary and Poland.83
How do these sudden and sweeping changes usually known as rights revolutions
come to occur? Establishing the cause for these sudden changes is complex because
contrary to the other branches of government, courts are passive actors, in that they
cannot actively seek cases to promote such transformations. They require individuals
to file claims to be able to promote legal change. This means that rights revolutions
require that a critical mass of citizens can overcome the obstacles imposed by the legal
system. For this reason, Charles Epp has claimed that rights revolutions occur not only
because of judicial activism, but due to the enhancement of citizen access to the judicial
system.84 Rights revolutions, then, are the result of providing citizens with the necessary
resources to organize collectively and promote legal change through litigation.
However, citizen empowerment seems to be a necessary yet insufficient condition to promote rights revolutions. Legal mobilization also depends on the perception of opportunities for success vis-à-vis other strategies.85 Social organizations and
individual plaintiffs are more likely to sue if they perceive that their claims might
be heard and decided favorably by the courts.86 However, it is unlikely that individuals or organizations will perceive they have a chance of success if their claims are
unlikely to reach the high courts. The likelihood of reaching a high court depends
on the messages that high courts send to both lower courts and to the citizenry.
Therefore, rights revolutions also require information flows between high courts and
citizens that promote litigation as a means of achieving legal change.87
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In this sense, higher courts play a somewhat different role from that of lower
courts. In addition to the social functions of all courts, courts at the apex of the
judicial pyramid also perform a cultural role that may seem somewhat paradoxical:
they help to promote conflicts. Or, to put it less provocatively, they contribute to
transforming societal perceptions with regards to situations previously considered
to be natural and unproblematic. It is in this last cultural function of identifying
emergent social problems and denaturalizing them, I believe reliance on AI for case
selection can pose a significant risk. As we will see, artificial intelligence, especially
machine learning, is based on the algorithms ability to learn by identifying preexisting legal concepts and patterns of past decisions. So even if AI can process more
information about social conflicts that have previously been defined as justiciable
claims, it cannot help to identify when and why patterns of emergent social conflicts
or naturalized social interaction should be regarded as problematic. AI can help
courts identify and select cases that fall into well-known patterns of justiciable claims,
which is key to reiterate top-down signals with respect to the applicable law, but it
is not helpful to promote the kinds of information exchanges about existing social
conflict between high courts and the citizens that lead to rights revolutions.
III. THE ROLE OF THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THE PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE INCREASE IN LITIGATION
This section describes the expansion of fundamental rights protection in Colombia
and the role that the Constitutional Court played in the process. The Courts responsiveness to rights claims rights led to a substantial increase in fundamental rights
litigation,88 thus promoting what can be called the Colombian rights revolution.
The Colombian Constitutional Court was established in 1992 after a constituent
assembly created a new constitution in 1991. The Court performs two basic tasks.89
The first is deciding abstract judicial review cases against congressional statutes and
regulations issued by the national executive which haves the same legal force as
statutes.90 The second task is reviewing lower courts decisions concerning the protection of fundamental constitutional rights via a right of action called tutela.91 Since
its beginnings, the Court broke with the traditional formalist approach to judicial
decision making prevalent in Colombia, quickly becoming a central player in the
countrys constitutional governance. The Court systematically curtailed the abuse of
presidential exceptional powers as a model of governance, successfully transforming
the countrys hyper-presidentialism into a more poised system of checks and balances.92
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Moreover, the Court even declared the unconstitutionality of a constitutional amendment that allowed indefinite presidential reelections based on its violation of a basic
pillar of the Colombian constitution.93
However, the protection of fundamental rights has been perhaps even more
important in fostering social and political change. Tutela, is, the right of action created
to provide injunctive relief for protecting fundamental constitutional rights. It was
established with the explicit intent of expanding access to justice for marginalized
segments of society who lack an efficient mechanism to resolve their conflicts with
the state and powerful private actors.94 Thus, individuals and legal persons can file
tutela claims to protect their fundamental rights whenever they are violated or
threatened by a state entity or a private actor that exerts some type of authority or
power over them, as long as they do not have other effective means of judicial protection of their rights.95 The procedure is informal, it can be filed upon any court,
and does not require legal representation. Moreover, tutela claims can even be filed
orally whenever the claimant cannot do so in writing.96 Finally, tutela is also an
expeditious procedure: courts have ten days to decide the claim in first instance,
twenty days on appeal, and judges have ample ex officio powers to gather evidence
and provide claimants with temporary protection orders.97
The rights protected by tutela have increased widely, and they include not only
civil and political rights, but social, environmental, and cultural rights.98 The
inclusion of social, environmental, and cultural rights as fundamental rights has been
a contentious issue. With few exceptions, the Colombian constitution does not
identify which rights are fundamental.99 However, initially, the Court only considered civil and political rights as fundamental and excluded social, environmental,
and cultural rights. In 1997, the Court started protecting social rights in cases when
denying a specific service or good included in the content of a social right threatened a right commonly considered fundamental (i.e., a civil or political right).100
This was generally known as the connectivity doctrine and can be illustrated with
the right to health. Although initially the Court did not recognize the right to health
as fundamental, it started regarding health rights as fundamental whenever denying
a person access to a given medication or medical treatment posed a risk to their
93
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life.101 During the late 1990s, Colombia, as the rest of Latin America, suffered a
harsh economic crisis that seriously affected peoples social and economic rights.
The crisis promoted a wave of tutela litigation seeking to protect the social and
economic rights of the affected lower and middle classes.102 Providing evidence of
a causal connection between the lack of a social or economic right and the threat to
civil or political rights became too cumbersome for both claimants and judges.
Moreover, the court also started protecting social rights by connecting them to
increasingly abstract and normative concepts like human dignity where showing
evidence of empirical threats was less relevant.103 Thus, in the mid-2000s, the Court
abandoned the connectivity criterion and started protecting social rights directly as
fundamental rights in and of themselves.104
Furthermore, during the late 1990s and 2000s, the catalogue of fundamental
rights expanded beyond rights explicitly included in the constitution. The Colombian court borrowed the doctrine of the constitutional bloc created by the French
constitutional council105 to enhance the bill of rights and protect international human
rights recognized in treaties as fundamental constitutional rights. The argument for
this expansion lies in a constitutional clause that establishes the prevalence of human
rights in the domestic legal system.106 In that way, the Court started protecting social,
economic, environmental, and cultural rights as fundamental. The protection of such
rights has meant that the types of subjects being protected has also changed. The
Court started protecting not just individuals, but collective actors such as labor unions,
neighborhood residents, indigenous groups and afro-Colombian organizations, and
even non-traditional legal subjects, such as rivers107 and forests.108 Thus, for example,
based on the International Labor Organizations 169 Convention on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples,109 the Court started protecting via tutela, the rights of
ethnic communities to a prior and informed consultation whenever the government
101
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sought to extract resources from their land or planned to issue a statute or administrative act that affected them directly.
The expansion of the catalogue of fundamental constitutional rights was not the
result of incremental changes also adopted top-down by the Court. Rather, the
expansion resulted from a rapid creation of legal categories in response to a growing
panoply of claimants increasingly gaining access to the judiciary and making novel
claims.110 Tutela increased access to the legal system to many social groups that
formerly lacked it. Enhanced access to the legal system was a necessary condition
that allowed these groups to resolve their conflicts with the state and with powerful
private actors against which they otherwise had no recourse. However, enhanced
access to justice was not a sufficient condition for the expansion of fundamental rights.
The Courts responsiveness to the claims made by marginalized social groups provided them with the normative toolkit to rapidly enhance the scope and nature of
their claims. In the words of a former justice of the Court, referring to the use of
tutela by indigenous peoples, [i]t provided such groups with a language; this is, a
vocabulary, and a grammar, that allowed them to pursue their claims.111
This process by which courts come to dominate the normative structure of a
community by resolving conflicts in different areas of social life has been referred
to as the judicialization of society.112 In its first stage, social actors interact among
themselves and with the state, and resolve the conflicts emerging from such interactions directly, either negotiating their social exchanges or simply lumping their
losses.113 When provided access and the appropriate incentives, these actors resort
to third parties, such as courts, to resolve their conflicts. In the process of resolving
their conflicts judges change and/or reaffirm the normative structure used to resolve
them.114 The changes in norms have two basic consequences: (1) they will impact
the direct interactions between social actors and (2) create an incentive for litigation
by social groups. However, the expansion of litigation depends on whether these
actors perceive they will benefit from the new rules created by the courts. In turn,
these new rules will also help forge new relationships between courts and different
segments of society.
An example of this process of judicialization can be observed clearly in the rise
of cases in tutela in Colombia. As Chart 1 shows below, the amount of tutelas filed
in Colombia has increased significantly since its creation. In 1992, lower courts
decided 12,809 claims, whereas in 2019, that number increased to 620,242 cases.115
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Image 1: Data configured by the author showing total tutela filings by year. The
years 2020 and 2021 present a significant decrease in the number of cases because courts were temporarily closed due to COVID-19.
Moreover, the types of rights protected have also changed drastically because
of the Courts jurisprudence. Until 1997, the Court did not consider social rights
fundamental. As mentioned before, that year, the Court stated that social rights could
be regarded as fundamental if they were connected to other civil and political rights
that were generally considered fundamental.116 Later, the Court discarded the connectivity requirement and started protecting certain social rights, like health, pensions, salaries, and social security benefits as inherently fundamental.117 Moreover,
it also started protecting cultural rights as fundamental rights even though some are
not explicitly recognized in the constitution. The Courts expansive social rights
jurisprudence created an incentive for litigation in that area. In the last three years,
at least 50.30% of tutela claims filed in the country requested the protection of social
rights, mostly health rights, pensions, humanitarian assistance and labor rights.118
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Image 2: Data configured by the author showing a breakdown of rights sought in
20192021 tutela filings.
As the increase in the number of social rights claims suggests, the Court plays
a key role in shaping not just the increase in litigation, but the specific areas and
issues on which individuals and groups file claims. The role of the Courts decisions
in shaping the types of rights claimed in the litigation that followed suggests that
docket selection is one of the most sensitive aspects of the Courts role. The types
of claims where there has been greater expansion were initially regarded by the
Court as nonjusticiable. Despite its initial position, the Court was responsive to a
growing need to address issues of social, economic, and ethnic disparities that plague
Colombia. Eventually, the Court changed its precedents, and in doing so it opened
the door of a rights revolution in areas like health rights, pensions, and housing,
and levelled the playing field between indigenous and companies seeking to extract
resources from their territories.119
The following section describes the current process of docket selection in the
Colombian Constitutional Court. It highlights the ways in which the Court obtains
information about social conflict through the analyses of the summaries of the lower
courts case files written by law clerks and the staff attorneys of the Courts judges.
Although there are several mechanisms that ultimately help filter cases that do not
merit selection for review, a critical mass of the judges staff are well informed
about the cases.
119
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE SELECTION MECHANISM
Various organs and officials of the Court participate in the selection process, but
perhaps the most important ones are: The Selection Panels, the Unit of Analysis and
Follow-Up to the Selection Process, and the Law Clerks. Additionally, attorneys
within the staff of each judge support the whole selection process, even though they
have different tasks depending on the way each judge organizes the teams work. In
what follows, this Article will describe the selection process, identifying their roles
and interactions to show how the information regarding the case files flows from
lower courts to the Constitutional Court.
As previously mentioned, individuals and legal persons can file tutela claims
upon any court. Once a tutela decision is final, the case file goes to the Constitutional Court to determine whether the Court will select it for review.120 After arriving
at the Court, the law clerks (law students in their final year who work for one of the
judges)121 read the case files and summarize them. Each judge works with approximately six or seven clerks, in addition to a staff of sixteen attorneys with different
levels of seniority that comprise each judges team.
A member of the staff of each judge is appointed to the Unit of Analysis and
Follow-Up of the Selection Process, who usually dedicates most, if not all, of her time
to this task. The role of the unit is to implement the selection criteria, create the
templates for the case files summaries that the law clerks write, supervise their work,
discuss with them any cases that may award being selected, and elaborate a long list
of preselected cases. This unit meets at least once a week to discuss current issues,
cases and trends, establish the best way to implement selection criteria and discuss
any problems that the selection process may have. Clerks are instructed by the unit
member in their judges team with regard to case selection and criteria discuss
candidate for review.122
Reading the files, analyzing the relevant case law, and discussing them is a timeconsuming task. Unit members are usually attorneys with several years of court
experience and are dedicated full-time to their task. If the unit member agrees the
case could be preselected for review, she will usually take it to one or more senior
attorneys in the judges team for further discussion. Thus, when a clerk identifies a
potential candidate case for review, usually at least three people in the judges team
are familiar with the case and its merits. Unit members then approve the preselection
of the case and indicate this in the cases summary. Case summaries of preselected,
120
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as well as non-preselected, cases are transferred to the staffs of the two justices
whose turn it is that month to be part of the Selection Panel.123
Selection panels are comprised of two judges, who meet roughly once a week
to select the cases for review and distribute them among the judges.124 Before each
meeting, the staff members of each judge read the summaries, analyze them, and
elaborate a format of written arguments justifying their position. These cases are
then discussed by each judge and their staff to define their position with respect to
each case. Once the judges position has been defined, the staff attorneys meet and
elaborate a short list of cases. These preliminary meetings reduce both the number
of cases and their disagreements. Then, the judges in turn for the panel and their
teams hold a formal meeting with the secretary of the court to decide what cases will
be selected for review. The judges that comprise the selection panel change every
month to avoid overburdening their teams.125
Despite being labor intensive, the selection process is not foolproof. Even though
case files are revised exhaustively and there are intentional redundancies geared
toward double-checking the selection process, some unworthy cases get selected
(false positives). More importantly, critical cases are sometimes overlooked (false
negatives). To correct the problem of false negatives in this classification process,
the Courts judges who did not participate in the selection process but may nevertheless be aware of the importance of a case before the Court can insist that the panel
select a case. Besides these judges, the countrys human rights ombudsperson, the
Procurador General, and the government can insist on the need to select a specific
case.126 In these circumstances, the selection panel considers the request and once
again decides whether there is any merit to select the case. However, the panel still
has complete autonomy in deciding whether there is merit to select the case.127
Moreover, the claimants or any individual with a legitimate interest can write an
informal request to the Court asking it to select a case.128 When one of the public
officials mentioned above insists on the selection of a case or a person requests it, the
staff attorneys analyze the case file and write a summary expressing their position
with respect to the selection of that case.129
As the former description shows, the selection process is a time-consuming
enterprise with significant redundancies. The same case files are read and summarized exhaustively, and their merits for review are analyzed by multiple participants
at different times. These redundancies have a specific purpose, which is to guarantee
that the Courts judges and their staffs are well-informed about existing patterns of
123
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fundamental rights violations within Colombian society and minimize false negatives in the selection process. In terms of the Weberian hierarchies described above,130
redundancies guarantee that the information with respect to patterns of conflict in
society flows upward to the apex of the hierarchy. This information is important because it enables the Court to adequately perform its functions of conflict resolution,
social control, and lawmaking. Without adequate information about existing social
conflict social conflicts would increase significantly, courts would not regard them
as justiciable and aggrieved individuals and groups would resort to other means to
resolve them.
The possibility that individuals and social groups resort to other means to resolve their conflicts, including illegal means, is a very real one, especially in a country
with a history of inequality, internal armed conflict, and violence, like Colombia.
The capacity of the judicial system to channel and resolve conflicts between parties
with significant power asymmetries can contribute to preventing individuals from
taking justice into their own hands and instead strengthen the legitimacy of the state.
The capacity of the judiciary to channel social conflict depends, among others, on
the availability of information that the Constitutional Court has about existing social
conflict.131 The availability of such information can enable the Court not only to
intervene directly to resolve such conflicts, but to create rules through which lower
courts can resolve them. Moreover, those same rules are likely to guide the interactions of social actors and governmental officials.132 Thus, redundancy in the docket
selection process is important because it guarantees that the Court has the information that will allow it to reduce social conflict.
During the first years of the existence of the Court, this type of redundancy in
the selection of its docket was feasible. However, as image 1 above shows, the number
of tutela case files the Court must analyze went from roughly 12,000 in 1992 to
620,000 in 2019. In other words, the number of case files that the Court needs to
analyze to select its docket has increased 5,100% in twenty-seven years.133 To provide a more temporally grounded idea of the order of magnitude, in any given week
of 2019, the Court received approximately the same number of case files that it
received during the whole year in 1992. The resources necessary for processing that
number of case files are exorbitant. Monitoring the elaboration of case file summaries,
analyzing their merits, and discussing them, is simply out of the Courts capacity.
Therefore, a more efficient mechanism to select the Courts docket is necessary. It
is for this reason that the Court has adopted a mechanism to simplify and expedite
the docket selection process. In what follows, this Article will describe the way in
which AI will be used to contribute to these two purposes.
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A. How Is AI Being Used for Case Selection in Colombia?
Understanding the function and precise extent to which AI is currently being
used for docket selection in Colombias Constitutional Court is difficult for various
reasons. For starters, the whole program has changed from its initial design, called
Prometea, to its current one, called PretorIA.134 The initial design, Prometea,135 was
based on the design used by the office of the Attorney of the Province of Buenos Aires,
Argentina, to assist its role by predicting the possible outcomes of the cases in which
it represents the interests of Buenos Aires and help it draft resolutions accordingly.
The Argentine version of the program uses machine learning and natural language
processing to read tax case files, predict possible outcomes, and generate official
documents based on the machines analysis.136 According to the Constitutional Court,
the current program used to assist the Court in the selection of its docket, PretorIA,
is much more modest and does not use machine learning.137
Another difficulty in establishing the specific technology of AI being in Colombias Constitutional Court lies in that there are significant discrepancies between the
way PretorIA is described by the Constitutional Court and by the entity in charge
of its implementation, the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (IALAB) of the University
of Buenos Aires, Argentina.138 According to members of the IT office of the Constitutional Court, the selection criteria at this stage are introduced manually, using specific
terms defined by the Unit of Analysis. At this stage, then, even if the program can
be considered artificial intelligence, it does not use machine learning. Much less
does it use deep learning, neural networks, or natural language processing. In fact,
according to the way it is described by the Courts IT team, PretorIA is not much
more than a sophisticated search engine that additionally performs some statistical
functions. Moreover, at this stage the program remains a pilot, and it is only being
used to select cases related to the right to health.139
In contrast, according to IALABs website, PretorIA uses supervised machine
learning to read thousands of case files and predict the presence of selection
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criteria.140 According to this account, the program would not just identify specific
terms being used in the case files and bring them forward, it would also predict
when the selection criteria are present in any given case.141 This kind of prediction
would require machine learning and the use of natural language processing in order
to identify the relevant case files, even when the specific search terms introduced by
the programmers. Moreover, this kind of prediction would also entail the capacity
to establish when a term is just mentioned in passing, when it is immaterial, or in
any case does not indicate the presence of a criteria for selection.
Regardless of the actual stage of development of PretorIA, whether the cases are
preselected with the assistance of a search engine which uses specific terms as criteria,
or the presence of such criteria are predicted using machine learning and natural
language processing, the Court will use pre-existing categories to preselect its docket.142
Using the terminology of Weberian hierarchies, the preestablished normative, topdown categories will be used, not only to send signals to lower courts, but to select
the docket.143 In other words, normative categories will be used to filter the signals
that an apex court will receive from lower courts with respect to existing social
conflicts. Preselecting the Courts docket based on pre-existing normative categories
will skew the process in favor of reiterating the Courts pre-existing case law. In
other words, the Court will look at the same types of claims which it has previously
analyzed. As we will see, this will be problematic for the function of conflict resolution, as there will be a significant segment of social conflict that will be excluded
from the outset. Moreover, it will also be problematic from the standpoint of lawmaking; particularly as it prevents the Court from responding to emergent social
problems and problematizing naturalized forms of social interaction.
V. ANALYSIS OF AI MECHANISMS USED TO SELECT THE COURTS DOCKET:
THE IDENTIFICATION OF OLD AND EMERGENT CONFLICTS
This section analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of using AI to assist the Constitutional Court preselect its docket of tutela cases. This section will analyze two
potential benefits: (1) AI can help the Court centralize and process large amounts of
information, and (2) it can do so more efficiently. Efficient processing of information
helps high courts identify when lower courts are not abiding by their precedents, thus
aiding them in their function of social control. In turn, the ability to centralize and
process greater amounts of information can help courts identify any structural causes
that underlie patterns of violation of fundamental rights. By identifying structural
causes of these violations, courts can devise new solutions to well-known, unresolved problems, facilitating their conflict resolution function.
140
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Nonetheless, using AI to preselect the docket of an apex court also has drawbacks with respect to judicial lawmaking and conflict resolution. Depending on the
type of AI used, the algorithm uses either key legal terms, or precedentthat is, past
patterns of decision-makingto help the Court preselect its docket.144 Therefore,
whether through predefined legal concepts or patterns of decision making, the machine
can only learn from a bounded legal context. It cannot consider an unbounded social
context, integrating and balancing its moral, political, economic and technological
components to identify when a case should be selected by the Court. Regardless of
their importance within the dynamic context that constitutes human experience,
cases are overlooked if they do not fit within pre-existing legal categories. In contrast, when lower courts decisions are analyzed by humans, and selection for review
is based on discussions between law clerks and staff lawyers, great importance is
given to the multiplicity and dynamism of human experience. In this way, docket
selection helps law to remain an institution that is dynamic and cognitively open to
the complexity of human experience.
Moreover, besides having a strictly legal input to select cases, AI selection is
based on information about prior cases or pre-existing legal categories. This means
that its way of processing information is exclusively anchored in the past, not based
on a vision of the future. Under these circumstances, law can become stifled and
fundamental rights can become less responsive to the ever-changing challenges of
our social and political life.145 Even though selecting a high courts docket based on
legal categories and past decisions does not necessarily mean that legal change is
impossible, it might become mostly marginal; change that only seeks to adjust minor
errors without promoting significant transformations. In the terms of the new constitutionalism literature, there will be no rights revolutions if the courts at the apex
of the judiciary select rights cases based on pre-existing legal concepts and patterns
of decision-making.
These circumstances show the importance of distinguishing the kinds of abilities
and processes we generally refer to as intelligence and learning when they are carried
out by a machine or by human beings to understand the proper place of AI in legal
decision making. However, before focusing on the drawbacks of using AI to select
the Courts docket, we will analyze some of its possible benefits.
A. The Possible Benefits of Using AI to Preselect the Courts Docket
As mentioned, the Court and the entity in charge of developing PretorIA represent its technology differently. While the Courts IT personnel says PretorIAs current
capacity is that of a search engine that uses terms to identify potentially relevant
144
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case files and executes some statistical functions, ILAB claims the program can
predict docket selection criteria.146 Some of the benefits and drawbacks of using
AI for the preselection of the Courts docket depend on the type of program that the
Court is using while others are independent of the type of program used by the
Court. In the description of benefits and drawbacks that follows I will make the distinctions whenever appropriate. As it will become evident throughout this section, the
core argument with respect to the limitations of AI in the identification of emerging
or naturalized social conflicts does not depend on the specific technology.147
In its most basic form, the ability of AI to find key terms in the documents of
case files can help the Court classify and select cases using to relevant legal terms.
Thus, even if PretorIA does not use machine learning, deep learning, and more
sophisticated forms of natural language processing, it can still assist in classifying
and selecting cases. According to the Courts IT division, at this stage PretorIA is
being used exclusively as a pilot program to assist in the selection of health rights
cases.148 However, in the future the Court seeks to expand the program to include
other rights and use a more sophisticated algorithm.149 In its current version for health
rights, the Court uses key terms to classify the gravity, urgency, or importance of the
claims that citizens are making and select those that it deems more urgent for claimants or important for the development of its case law.
However, the ability of programs that use term searches is limited and still
requires a significant amount of human labor to select the cases. Moreover, term
searches are fallible because not all lower courts use the exact same legal terms and
the case files do not necessarily contain the same relevant information. For those
reasons, term searches might produce false negatives, this is, they might fail to
include all the relevant cases. On the other hand, this type of technology might also
lead to the opposite problem of false positives, because the mere presence of a term
in a case file does not necessarily indicate the subject matter of a case. Thus, a simple
term search might result in the preselection of cases that are not real candidates,
which would entail further depuration of the results.
These problems can be minimized by using a version of AI that employs machine
learning and a more sophisticated mechanism of natural language processingone that
can learn to identify not just the precise terms being fed to the machine, but terms
within the semantic field of the underlying concept.150 Such technology can prevent
relevant cases from falling through the cracks because courts use terms that are
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different from the ones fed to the machine.151 More sophisticated versions of natural
language processing algorithms can also evaluate the importance that a specific concept
has within a case file by measuring its prevalence within the analyzed documents,
thus avoiding the problem of overinclusion inherent to search engines that use specific
search terms. Finally, natural language processing can also identify syntax, which
can actually improve the analysis of the content of documents in the case files.152 However, these more advanced algorithms that use machine learning to discern patterns, natural language processing, and deep learning, are not a panacea either, and should be
carefully monitored. Nonetheless, they do represent an advancement over the kinds of
term search programs allegedly used by the Court in the present phase of PretorIA.
Greater efficiency in docket selection improves consistency in the application
of case law,153 because it helps high courts to identify more accurately when lower
courts are not abiding by their precedents. Consistency in the application of the law
is an important dimension of social control. Thus, by selecting the docket more efficiently the Constitutional Court is contributing to exercise social control, which as
we saw, is one of the three basic functions of courts. However, as the conclusion
discusses, docket selection is not the only way to achieve consistency in the application of the law, nor the most efficient way to do so.154 The highest level courts currently have limited resources that must be used wisely, and correcting the errors of
lower courts directly may be overly burdensome. As we saw, the number of claims
made in an average week during 2019 correspond to all the tutela claims made
during the entire year of 1992. By reiterating its own case law every time a lower
court makes an error, the Colombian Constitutional Court operates beyond its capacity.
Moreover, attempting to assume such a role directly by reviewing every lower court
decision increases the probability of further contradiction between the panels of the
Colombian Constitutional Court. As a result, lower courts receive contradictory messaging, further aggravating inconsistencies in the application of case law.155 Therefore, one of the conclusions of this Article is that there might be less risky and more
efficient ways to use AI to convey applicable precedent to lower courts. Additionally,
there might be some important ways in which the Constitutional Court can use AI
to mitigate the structural pattern of fundamental rights violation.
In certain cases, the violation of fundamental rights may be the result of an
isolated and discrete event. However, critical legal studies,156 and critical race
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theorists157 have highlighted that these violations are not isolated events but commonly result from structural factors deeply embedded in society. In many cases, the
institutions of the state or the market economy are at the root cause of the most
pervasive breaches. A country like Colombia, with a decades-long civil war, largescale corruption and a deeply seated drug economy is very likely to present these
patterns of widespread fundamental rights violations. Some of them, like massacres
committed by armed actors are visible, but others are not. Moreover, even evident
violations of fundamental rights may not have readily visible causes.
AI can help the Court identify the underlying factors that motivate multiple individual tutela claims and act consequently to address such causes. Thus, for example,
the identification of a spatial pattern may suggest that there is a local state entity or
a private party with regional power affecting such rights. At the very least, centralizing information with respect to similar claims instead of decentralizing the analysis
by assigning it to different law clerks can render important information to the Court.
The Constitutional Court understands certain patterns of violations have structural causes that require solutions that require more than simply addressing the
specific situation of individual claimants. However, the Courts awareness has been
the result of waves of litigation around well-defined areas of social conflict that had
already been recognized as fundamental rights violations, like the situation of peasants
who were internally displaced by Colombias civil war,158 or inmates subject to inhumane prison conditions.159 To address these kinds of violations effectively, the
Court created a legal doctrine, which it named an unconstitutional state of affairs,
which has also been adopted in other Constitutional Courts in Latin America.160
Declaring an unconstitutional state of affairs allows the Court to select all relevant
cases for review, analyze the underlying claims in a comprehensive manner and
issue orders to the government that reach beyond the specific situations of individual
plaintiffs. Such orders have required the government to design public policies, promote
statutory changes in Congress, allocate the necessary funds to develop certain programs, among many others. Moreover, it also allows the appointment of special masters
to secure compliance with the Courts orders.
157
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This happened when inmates in various prisons around the country started filing
claims due to inhumane prison conditions, including overcrowding, mistreatment,
and lack of access to medical services. At first the Court simply ordered prison
directors to provide required medical services, or relocate individual inmates, or to
initiate investigations on mistreatment of inmates. It was not until the Court started
selecting such cases and accumulating them into a single procedure that the magnitude of the problem, its different dimensions and causes became evident. Overcrowding was systemic in national and municipal prisons and relocating inmates did
nothing to address the problem. The Court then established that the inhumane
conditions claimed in tutelas went beyond the situation of claimants. It affected
24,107 inmates of a prison population of approximately 117,000, this is approximately
21% of the total prison population, which represented around 11.67% of the countrys
prisons.161 However, the Court also realized that building more prisons, or reforming
them, would not solve the problem. The Court went beyond prison reform and
addressed the problems of the criminal system, identifying causes, adopting concrete
measures, requiring the government to promote a large-scale criminal reform, and
monitoring its development.162
Another declaration of an unconstitutional state of affairs was triggered by the
humanitarian crisis of internal displacement caused by Colombias civil war.163 Although internal displacement has been a constant trait in Colombia for almost seventy
years, it became critical in 1998, when approximately 308,000 people were displaced,
and in 2002, when around 412,553 more people were displaced.164 The Court had selected cases of internally displaced people, grating them protection and issuing orders
to the government to provide the claimants with the necessary humanitarian assistance.
However, it was not until 2004 when the Court decided to tackle with the problem in a different way. It selected for review the tutela claims made by thousands
of people and issued guidelines of the policies the government needed to create to
guarantee the basic rights of internally displaced people, regardless of whether they
had filed tutela claims. Moreover, it maintained its jurisdiction over the case and
created a system to monitor compliance with its decisions and issue new orders on
specific issues. The Court could not do much to end the countrys civil war, and in
this respect, it did not address the root cause of internal displacement. However, it
did address most of the institutional hurdles that prevented displaced people from
being able to enjoy their basic constitutional rights and regain control of their lives.
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Thus, the Court organized its monitoring task by focusing on the types of institutional problems confronted by different types of claimants, focusing at different times
on different social groups, like indigenous peoples, women, children, among others.
AI could have helped not only in the selection of these cases, but also in the organization according to the patterns of recurring institutional hurdles saving time and
significantly improving the quality of life of victims of forced internal displacement.
Besides centralizing the analysis of these cases, AI can establish when individual
claims correspond to larger patterns of litigation and provide valuable information that
can help the Court identify structural causes of such violations. In the case of the
prison conditions, the Court established that the increasingly inhumane prison conditions were related to an increasing reliance on criminal law to resolve social problems that significantly increased the prison population. However, this was the result
of a painstaking analysis of thousands of case files. A sophisticated algorithm can help
the Court identify patterns and correlations more efficiently.165 In this way, more
complex algorithms that use machine learning, natural language processing and deep
learning can assist the Court in its functions of conflict resolution and lawmaking.
However, the cases of the inhumane prison conditions and internally displaced
people were in the Courts radar because they had already been considered fundamental rights violations by the legal system. Individual claims had been granted
before, and only later did the Court come to address their structural components.
The situation is very different when the Court has not previously considered a pattern of social conflict as justiciable. In such cases, the use of AI as a tool to help
preselect the Courts docket can render these cases invisible.
As mentioned previously, in a working judiciary there is always a division of
labor between lower courts and those at the apex of the judicial system. High-level
courts, like the Colombian Constitutional Court, are more focused on lawmaking
than on social control or conflict resolution. Lower courts, in turn, are more focused
on conflict resolution and social control than on lawmaking. In these hierarchical
structures, information with respect to the applicable law flows downward, because
it is courts at the apex that establish the precedents which should govern certain
social interactions. In turn, information with respect to existing social conflict flows
upward through appeals and reviews performed by higher courts.
Docket selection is fundamental to guarantee the adequate flow of information
throughout the judiciary, not just to control lower courts deviance from precedent,
but because it keeps high courts informed about the existing conflicts in a society.
Therefore, even though courts at the apex of the hierarchy need to be informed about
cases of deviance from its precedent, bottom-up information cannot be limited to
such cases. Bottom-up flows of information must also include the whole universe of
cases about existing social conflict. If a court at the apex of the hierarchy only receives
information about types of social conflicts that are already considered justiciable,
165
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this will prevent them from being able to address new types of conflicts. On the
other hand, having information with respect to a more representative universe of the
conflicts in Colombian society allows them to intervene and create a new body of
case law that helps to provide solutions for emerging conflicts, or otherwise injurious
experiences that have become naturalized.
An example that illustrates the importance of docket selection in providing information about social conflict is how social rights became fundamental in Colombia.
As mentioned, during its initial years the Court did not regard social rights as fundamental. However, at some point the Court decided to select one such case and
created a legal doctrine that allowed it to categorize social rights as fundamental. 166
Initially, social rights cases were selected because they were dramatic life and death
circumstances. These cases were crucial, as they opened the door to other, less dramatic ones, until ultimately, social rights became regularly protected as fundamental.
However, the Court could not have changed its case law on social rights if it did not
have information about these initial cases. And it would lack such information if it
was not included as one of the terms processed by the algorithm or the search engine
(depending on the current state of PretorIA) to select cases. The problem with using
key legal terms to select the Courts docket is that it skews the sample of cases
available to the Court in favor of reiterating its own case law.
The first, rather dramatic social rights cases in the Court were not selected
because they conformed to the Courts notion of a fundamental right.167 After all, at
that time the Court had expressly rejected the notion that these rights were fundamental.168 This does not mean that the people who selected these cases were somehow doing it without regard to law or acting fraudulently. Instead, they selected these
cases because their own experiences showed them that rights are intricately connected
to each other, and sometimes, fundamental rights like the right to life depends on a
persons access to medication, a medical treatment, food, housing, clean water, and
many other social rights. Understanding how a specific good or service can be fundamental under certain circumstances requires the ability to understand the complexity
of human experience, this is, the physical, social, cultural, and political context in
which human beings live.
The relation between human experience and docket selection helps to conceptualize this task, or more precisely, to understand its relation to law. It shows that an
apex courts decision to select a case ought not be based only on what the law is at
any given point in time, but on what the law should be. Given that courts at the apex
of the judicial pyramid focus more on lawmaking than on social control or conflict
resolution, docket selection is a step that precedes the creation of case law. Thus, it
is not exactly a legal role, but a moral or political one.
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One way to understand the relation between law and docket selection is by
considering how sociology of law describes the interaction between law and other
areas of social life. In this respect, the work of Niklas Luhmann, is particularly
useful.169 Luhmann described law as a social subsystem that is operationally closed,
but cognitively open.170 This means that law is open to changes in other areas of social
life, but it maintains its own system of internal rules and procedures to determine its
content and distinguish it from other areas of social life like moral norms or politics.171
And one of the gateways through which law maintains its cognitive openness is precisely through the process of selecting the docket of courts at the apex of the judiciary.
To maintain laws cognitive openness, docket selection needs to analyze a wide
universe of cases considering emerging moral norms, changing political perspectives, new technologies, comparative legal experiences, and so many other different
contexts. But this kind of analysis, which is open to different areas of social life, is
not the same as the type of rule-driven, pattern-finding type of contextual analysis
that AI executes.172 The type of analysis required for docket selection is informed,
not just by empathy, but by the ability of drawing analogies and knowledge from
multiple contexts, integrating is according to parameters defined by human experience. Moreover, it is a kind of analysis that focuses on the past to assist in the process
of decision-making, but it also requires a forward-looking legal imagination. Rights
revolutions, like the invention of a constitution, or the construction of a bill of
rights, or the adoption of structural decisions due to an unconstitutional state of
affairs would never have occurred if a court was never confronted with the need to
create them to decide novel cases.
However, the limitations of AI for docket selection come from the machines
inability to experience the human condition and is thus independent from technological advancement. In its most basic form PretorIA uses key terms to classify and
preselect cases for the Courts docket. 173 More advanced versions of AI that use
machine learning, natural language processing and deep learning can use patterns
of the Courts decisions to identify when lower courts have deviated from precedent.
Whether PretorIA uses legal terms or previous decisions to preselect cases, it tends
to exclude novel types of cases, where claims were not based on pre-existing legal
concepts or cannot be decided using previous case law.
Even if PretorIA uses natural language processing and deep learning, which
allow it to identify the semantic fields of legal concepts, and enable higher levels of
abstraction, it would still be unable to identify emerging patterns of social conflict
or to problematize naturalized patterns of injurious social interaction. This is in part
169
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because the patterns it is taught to recognize, and those it will identify on its own,
are defined through pre-existing legal categories and established patterns of decision
making. However, the main function of courts at the apex of the pyramid is not to
guarantee that the law is applied consistently, but to create law. For this reason, docket
selection is not exactly a legal function of a court. Rather, the decision to select a case,
although guided by the possibilities of what law can become, is ultimately a moral,
social, or political decision.
A machine like PretorIA can only learn from bounded contexts, which in this
case is the input of legal decisions that the algorithm is programmed to include.174 In
contrast, humans can use knowledge acquired from one field in another. For example,
humans can use their knowledge of economics, ethics, biology, or sociology, and apply it to different areas of law and vice versa. More importantly, humans can discern
when and why a certain body of knowledge is more relevant than the other. A machine
cannot expand the context in the same way. Even if in theory a machine can consider its knowledge of the larger social, moral, political and economic context to
identify such cases, it is not clear that it can discern what is relevant and why.
The problems of using AI to assist a high court in the selection of its docket
shows precisely what the early critics of AI had in mind when they asserted that
there is no such thing as disembodied intelligence, and that the kinds of processes
carried out by a machine, as helpful as they may be, are very different from human
intelligence. Experiencing the complex web of circumstances that constitute the
human experience shapes our ability to create the categories that help us understand
the world and to draw analogies from different contexts. Part of our inherently
human ability is that we are able to draw from our experience in one area of social
life and apply the knowledge we gain to another area. This is, of course, true of law.
Our knowledge of technology, sociology, morality, and other areas of social life,
nurture our legal categories and modes of reasoning. However, this does not change
the nature of law.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the role of AI in the preselection of cases for review by the
Colombian Constitutional Court illustrates the nature of docket selection and its
importance for judicial responsiveness. Docket selection is a key mechanism that
serves to maintain courts at the apex of the judiciary informed about existing conflicts
in a society, enabling them to intervene in certain areas of social life. AI, however, uses
pre-existing legal categories and patterns of decision making to filter that information. In doing so, AI processes larger amounts of information more efficiently, identifying when lower courts deviate from precedent. Additionally, complex types of
machine learning can also help to identify structural causes of certain patterns of
174
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fundamental rights violations. Moreover, machine learning can adapt to context.
However, this context is very limited, anchored in pre-existing legal concepts and
decisions. For this reason, using AI for docket selection also excludes novel or
emerging social conflicts, as well as naturalized forms of social interaction that become problematic because of changing cultural perceptions.
Docket selection, as an example of a classification problem, illustrates the tradeoff
between the need to reduce false positives, which tends to reduce the Courts workload
making it more efficient, and the need to reduce the false negatives, which tends
to increase the Courts workload, but it secures greater judicial responsiveness to
social conflict. There is no a priori optimal solution to this tradeoff. However, as this
Article suggests, the costs of false negatives in the docket selection tend to increase
significantly during times of rapid social and political change. In such conditions,
false negatives tend to diminish the ability of the legal system to translate rapid social,
technological and cultural transformations into legal categories, which might ultimately lead to an unresponsive legal system.
The shortcomings of AI as a tool in the selection of the docket of a high court
depend, not on the specific technology being used, but on the fact that machines
cannot experience the complexity of the human condition. It is our unique experience as human beings that allows us to draw information from multiple areas of our
lives, integrate them, discern which area is relevant in a specific context, and justify
our choices in ways that are legitimate to others because they resonate with their
human experience. This ability is especially important if law is to remain a cognitively
open, or to put it differently, a socially responsive institution.
Nevertheless, two different adaptations can tend to mitigate the problems that
PretorIA can create in the protection of fundamental rights by the Colombian Constitutional Court. The first adaptation would be to create certain override mechanisms
that lead to a totally human selection process when the algorithm identifies certain
conditions. An example of one such override could refer to certain categories of
protected claimants, like racial, ethnic or gender minorities. In these circumstances,
whenever the algorithm identifies that the claimant belongs to one of such especially
protected categories, the selection process becomes completely performed by humans
according to the pre-existing system. This override selectively mitigates the impact
that an AI led docket selection mechanism might have over certain claimants. Moreover, these categories do not need to be static. Instead, they might be introduced at
different times through supervised learning to reflect existing social conflicts. Introducing a dynamic override mechanism that reflects changing patterns of social
conflict might improve the classification problems. However, introducing these
mechanisms might also bring its own challenges, like maintaining transparency.
Moreover, PretorIA can be used differently to serve the same purpose for which
it was created. If its purpose is to create a more efficient system of review of lower
court decisions in tutela and promote greater legal certainty by preserving the principle of stare decisis, perhaps the best way to do so is not to identify lower courts
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deviations from precedent so the Court can correct them. This may overburden the
Court, as it would have to select a great number of cases to reiterate its case law.
Moreover, as already mentioned, it may also be counterproductive, as it increases
the probability of different panels of the Court establishing contradictory precedents.
Instead, PretorIA can be used to help lower courts identify the governing precedents
for the tutela cases they need to resolve. As mentioned in the first section of this
Article, law firms are already using AI to help their clients identify useful precedents
for their claims. This same technology can be used to provide lower courts with the
relevant decisions. In this way, the Constitutional Court would not have to select so
many cases just to reiterate its case law.

